

# Free Questions for CKS by ebraindumps

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# **Question 1**

### **Question Type:** MultipleChoice

Given an existing Pod named nginx-pod running in the namespace test-system, fetch the service-account-name used and put the content in /candidate/KSC00124.txt

Create a new Role named dev-test-role in the namespace test-system, which can perform update operations, on resources of type namespaces.

Create a new RoleBinding named dev-test-role-binding, which binds the newly created Role to the Pod's ServiceAccount (found in the Nginx pod running in namespace test-system).

### **Options:**

**A-** Explanation:

```
candidate@cli:~$ kubectl config use-context KSCH00201
Switched to context "KSCH00201".
candidate@cli:~$ kubectl get pods -n security
                 STATUS
                           RESTARTS
NAME
                                      AGE
         READY
web-pod
        1/1
                 Running
                           0
                                      6h9m
candidate@cli:~$ kubectl get deployments.apps -n security
No resources found in security namespace.
candidate@cli:~$ kubectl describe rolebindings.rbac.authorization.k8s.io -n security
Name:
             dev-role
Labels:
             <none>
Annotations: <none>
Role:
 Kind: Role
 Name: dev-role
Subjects:
  Kind
                 Name
                           Namespace
  ServiceAccount sa-dev-1
candidate@cli:~$ kubectl describe role dev-role -n security
             dev-role
Name:
Labels:
             <none>
Annotations:
             <none>
PolicyRule:
  Resources Non-Resource URLs Resource Names Verbs
                               candidate@cli:~$ kubectl edit role/dev-role -n security
```

```
candidate@cli:~$ kubectl describe role dev-role -n security
             dev-role
Name:
Labels:
             <none>
Annotations: <none>
PolicyRule:
  Resources Non-Resource URLs Resource Names Verbs
             []
                                               [*]
candidate@cli:~$ kubectl edit role/dev-role -n security
role.rbac.authorization.k8s.io/dev-role edited
candidate@cli:~$ kubectl describe role dev-role -n security
             dev-role
Name:
Labels:
             <none>
Annotations: <none>
PolicyRule:
 Resources Non-Resource URLs Resource Names Verbs
 services []
                               [watch]
candidate@cli:~$ kubectl get pods -n security
         READY
                 STATUS
                           RESTARTS
NAME
                                      AGE
                 Running 0
         1/1
                                      6h12m
web-pod
candidate@cli:~$ kubectl get pods/web-pod -n security -o yaml | grep serviceAccount
 serviceAccount: sa-dev-1
 serviceAccountName: sa-dev-1
     - serviceAccountToken:
candidate@cli:~$ kubectl create role role-2 --verb=update --resource=namespaces -n security
role.rbac.authorization.k8s.io/role-2 created
candidate@cli:~$ kubectl create rolebinding role-2-binding --role
--role --role=
candidate@cli:~$ kubectl create rolebinding role-2-binding --role=role-2 --serviceaccount=se
curity:sa-dev-1 -n security
rolebinding.rbac.authorization.k8s.io/role-2-binding created
candidate@cli:~$ ∏
```

#### **Answer:**

Α

# **Question 2**

#### **Question Type:** MultipleChoice

Create a PSP that will only allow the persistent/volumeclaim as the volume type in the namespace restricted.

Create a new PodSecurityPolicy named prevent-volume-policy which prevents the pods which is having different volumes mount apart from persistentvolumeclaim.

Create a new ServiceAccount named psp-sa in the namespace restricted.

Create a new ClusterRole named psp-role, which uses the newly created Pod Security Policy prevent-volume-policy

Create a new ClusterRoleBinding named psp-role-binding, which binds the created ClusterRole psp-role to the created SA psp-sa.

Hint:

Also, Check the Configuration is working or not by trying to Mount a Secret in the pod maifest, it should get failed.

**POD Manifest:** 

kind: Pod		
metadata:		
name:		
spec:		
containers:		
- name:		
image:		
volumeMounts:		
- name:		
mountPath:		
volumes:		
- name:		
secret:		
secretName:		

apiVersion: v1

### **Options:**

### **A-** Explanation:

apiVersion: policy/v1beta1

kind: PodSecurityPolicy

metadata:

name: restricted

annotations:

seccomp.security.alpha.kubernetes.io/allowedProfileNames: 'docker/default,runtime/default'

apparmor.security.beta.kubernetes.io/allowedProfileNames: 'runtime/default'

seccomp.security.alpha.kubernetes.io/defaultProfileName: 'runtime/default'

apparmor.security.beta.kubernetes.io/defaultProfileName: 'runtime/default'

spec:

privileged: false

# Required to prevent escalations to root.

allowPrivilegeEscalation: false

# This is redundant with non-root + disallow privilege escalation,

# but we can provide it for defense in depth.

requiredDropCapabilities:

- ALL

# Allow core volume types.

volumes:

- 'configMap'
- 'emptyDir'
- 'projected'
- 'secret'

- 'downwardAPI'

# Assume that persistentVolumes set up by the cluster admin are safe to use.

- 'persistentVolumeClaim'

hostNetwork: false

hostIPC: false

hostPID: false

runAsUser:

# Require the container to run without root privileges.

rule: 'MustRunAsNonRoot'

seLinux:

# This policy assumes the nodes are using AppArmor rather than SELinux.

rule: 'RunAsAny'

supplementalGroups:

rule: 'MustRunAs'

ranges:

# Forbid adding the root group.

- min: 1

max: 65535

fsGroup:

rule: 'MustRunAs'

ranges:

# Forbid adding the root group.

- min: 1

max: 65535

readOnlyRootFilesystem: false

#### **Answer:**

Α

# **Question 3**

### **Question Type:** MultipleChoice

Fix all issues via configuration and restart the affected components to ensure the new setting takes effect.

Fix all of the following violations that were found against the API server:-

- a. Ensure that the RotateKubeletServerCertificate argument is set to true.
- b. Ensure that the admission control plugin PodSecurityPolicy is set.
- c. Ensure that the --kubelet-certificate-authority argument is set as appropriate.

Fix all of the following violations that were found against the Kubelet:-

- a. Ensure the --anonymous-auth argument is set to false.
- b. Ensure that the --authorization-mode argument is set to Webhook.

Fix all of the following violations that were found against the ETCD:-

a. Ensure that the --auto-tls argument is not set to true

b. Ensure that the --peer-auto-tls argument is not set to true

Hint: Take the use of Tool Kube-Bench

### **Options:**

### **A-** Explanation:

Fix all of the following violations that were found against the API server:-

a. Ensure that the RotateKubeletServerCertificate argument is set to true.

apiVersion: v1

kind: Pod

metadata:

creationTimestamp: null

labels:

component: kubelet

tier: control-plane

name: kubelet

namespace: kube-system

spec:

containers:

- command:
- kube-controller-manager
- + -- feature gates = Rotate Kubel et Server Certificate = true

image: gcr.io/google\_containers/kubelet-amd64:v1.6.0

livenessProbe:

failureThreshold: 8

httpGet:

host: 127.0.0.1 path: /healthz

port: 6443

scheme: HTTPS

initialDelaySeconds: 15

timeoutSeconds: 15

name: kubelet

resources:

requests:

cpu: 250m

volumeMounts:

- mountPath: /etc/kubernetes/

name: k8s

readOnly: true

- mountPath: /etc/ssl/certs

name: certs

- mountPath: /etc/pki

name: pki

hostNetwork: true

volumes:

- hostPath:

path: /etc/kubernetes

name: k8s - hostPath:

path: /etc/ssl/certs name: certs - hostPath: path: /etc/pki name: pki b. Ensure that the admission control plugin PodSecurityPolicy is set. audit: '/bin/ps -ef | grep \$apiserverbin | grep -v grep' tests: test\_items: - flag: '--enable-admission-plugins' compare: op: has value: 'PodSecurityPolicy' set: true remediation: | Follow the documentation and create Pod Security Policy objects as per your environment. Then, edit the API server pod specification file \$apiserverconf on the master node and set the --enable-admission-plugins parameter to a value that includes PodSecurityPolicy: --enable-admission-plugins=...,PodSecurityPolicy,... Then restart the API Server. scored: true c. Ensure that the --kubelet-certificate-authority argument is set as appropriate. audit: '/bin/ps -ef | grep \$apiserverbin | grep -v grep' tests: test\_items:

- flag: '--kubelet-certificate-authority'

set: true

remediation: |

Follow the Kubernetes documentation and setup the TLS connection between the apiserver and kubelets. Then, edit the API server pod specification file \$apiserverconf on the master node and set the --kubelet-certificate-authority parameter to the path to the cert file for the certificate authority.

--kubelet-certificate-authority=<ca-string>

scored: true

Fix all of the following violations that were found against the ETCD:-

a. Ensure that the --auto-tls argument is not set to trueEdit the etcd pod specification file \$etcdconf on the masternode and either remove the --auto-tls parameter or set it to false.

- --auto-tls=false
- b. Ensure that the --peer-auto-tls argument is not set to true

  Edit the etcd pod specification file \$etcdconf on the master

  node and either remove the --peer-auto-tls parameter or set it to false.

--peer-auto-tls=false

#### **Answer:**

Α

# **Question 4**

### **Question Type:** MultipleChoice

Create a User named john, create the CSR Request, fetch the certificate of the user after approving it.

Create a Role name john-role to list secrets, pods in namespace john

Finally, Create a RoleBinding named john-role-binding to attach the newly created role john-role to the user john in the namespace john. To Verify:Use the kubectl auth CLI command to verify the permissions.

### **Options:**

#### **A-** Explanation:

se kubectl to create a CSR and approve it.

Get the list of CSRs:

kubectl get csr

Approve the CSR:

kubectl certificate approve myuser

Get the certificate

Retrieve the certificate from the CSR:

kubectl get csr/myuser -o yaml

here are the role and role-binding to give john permission to create NEW\_CRD resource:

kubectl apply -f roleBindingJohn.yaml --as=john

rolebinding.rbac.authorization.k8s.io/john\_external-rosource-rb created

kind: RoleBinding

apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1

metadata:

name: john\_crd

namespace: development-john

subjects:

kind: Username: john

apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io

roleRef:

kind: ClusterRole name: crd-creation kind: ClusterRole

apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1

metadata:

name: crd-creation

rules:

- apiGroups: ['kubernetes-client.io/v1']

resources: ['NEW\_CRD'] verbs: ['create, list, get']

### **Answer:**

Α

# **Question 5**

#### **Question Type:** MultipleChoice

Two tools are pre-installed on the cluster's worker node:

Using the tool of your choice (including any non pre-installed tool), analyze the container's behavior for at least 30 seconds, using filters that detect newly spawning and executing processes.

Store an incident file at /opt/KSRS00101/alerts/details, containing the detected incidents, one per line, in the following format:

timestamp,uid/username,proce
ssName

The following example shows a properly formatted incident file:

01:40:19.601363716, root, init

01:40:20.606013716, nobody, ba

sh

01:40:21.137163716,1000,tar

Keep the tool's original timestamp-format as-is.



Make sure to store the incident file on the cluster's worker node.

# **Options:**

**A-** Explanation:

```
candidate@cli:~$ kubectl config use-context KSRS00101
Switched to context "KSRS00101".
candidate@cli:~$ ssh ksrs00101-worker1
Warning: Permanently added '10.240.86.96' (ECDSA) to the list of known hosts.
The programs included with the Ubuntu system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.
Ubuntu comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by
applicable law.
root@ksrs00101-worker1:~# falco
falco
                     falco-driver-loader
root@ksrs00101-worker1:~# ls -1 /etc/falco/
total 200
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 12399 Jan 31 16:06 aws cloudtrail rules.yaml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 11384 Jan 31 16:06 falco.yaml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1136 Jan 31 16:06 falco rules.local.yaml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 132112 Jan 31 16:06 falco rules.yaml
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 27289 Jan 31 16:06 k8s audit rules.yaml
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Feb 16 01:07 rules.available
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Jan 31 16:28 rules.d
root@ksrs00101-worker1:~# vim /etc/falco/falco rules.local.yaml
```

```
# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #
**************
 rule: Container Drift Detected (chmod)
 desc: New executable created in a container due to chmod
 condition: >
```

art time in James amount avental and

```
root@ksrs00101-worker1:~# vim /etc/falco/falco_rules.local.yaml
root@ksrs00101-worker1:~# systemctl status falco.service

• falco.service - Falco Runtime Security

Loaded: loaded (/lib/systemd/system/falco.service; disabled; vendor preset: enabled)
Active: inactive (dead)
root@ksrs00101-worker1:~# systemctl enable falco.service
Created symlink /etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants/falco.service → /lib/systemd/system/falco.service.
root@ksrs00101-worker1:~# systemctl start falco.service
root@ksrs00101-worker1:~# exit
logout
Connection to 10.240.86.96 closed.
candidate@cli:~$ ssh ksrs00101-worker1
Last login: Fri May 20 15:59:48 2022 from 10.240.86.88
root@ksrs00101-worker1:~# vim /etc/falco/falco.yaml
```

```
# When using json output, whether or not to include the "tags" property
# itself in the json output. If set to true, outputs caused by rules
# with no tags will have a "tags" field set to an empty array. If set to
# false, the "tags" field will not be included in the json output at all.
json_include_tags_property: true

# Send information logs to stderr and/or syslog Note these are *not* security
# notification logs! These are just Falco lifecycle (and possibly error) logs.
log_stderr: true
log_syslog: true
log_file: /opt/KSRS00101/alerts/details

# Minimum log level to include in logs. Note: these levels are
# separate from the priority field of rules. This refers only to the
# log level of falco's internal logging. Can be one of "emergency",
# "alert", "critical", "error", "warning", "notice", "info", "debug".
log level: info
```

```
root@ksrs00101-worker1:~# vim /etc/falco/falco.yaml
root@ksrs00101-worker1:~# grep log /etc/falco/falco.yaml
# cloudtrail log files.
# If true, the times displayed in log messages and output messages
# Send information logs to stderr and/or syslog Note these are *not* security
# notification logs! These are just Falco lifecycle (and possibly error) logs.
log stderr: true
log syslog: true
log file: /opt/KSRS00101/alerts/details
# Minimum log level to include in logs. Note: these levels are
# log level of falco's internal logging. Can be one of "emergency",
log level: info
# - log: log a DEBUG message noting that the buffer was full
# Notice it is not possible to ignore and log/alert messages at the same time.
# The rate at which log/alert messages are emitted is governed by a

    log

# The timeout error will be reported to the log according to the above log * settings.
syslog output:
# - logging (alternate method than syslog):
         program: logger -t falco-test
# this information will be logged, however the main Falco daemon will not be stopped.
root@ksrs00101-worker1:~# systemctl restart falco.service
root@ksrs00101-worker1:~# exit
logout
Connection to 10.240.86.96 closed.
candidate@cli:~$
```

#### **Answer:**

Α

# **Question 6**

### **Question Type:** MultipleChoice

use the Trivy to scan the following images,

- 1. amazonlinux:1
- 2. k8s.gcr.io/kube-controller-manager:v1.18.6

Look for images with HIGH or CRITICAL severity vulnerabilities and store the output of the same in /opt/trivy-vulnerable.txt

### **Options:**

- A- Send us your suggestion on it.
- **B-** Send us your suggestion

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